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BOOK REVIEWS
review can be broadened in our system without impairing the efficiency of
administrative action.
Professor Schwartz points out various aspects of the French system that
appear to him to be in advance of Anglo-American administrative law, in-
cluding simplicity in procedures for appeals to the courts, and reduction of the
costs of litigation.
FRANK E. COOPER*
* Member of the Michigan Bar.
VIMHWEG, T. Topik und Jurisprudenz. Miinchen: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1953.
Pp. 75.
During the 19th and a considerable part of the 20th centuries, Civil Law
jurisprudence, especially in Germany and Italy, was inspired by the idea that
the totality of a legal order could be conceived as a logically closed and con-
sistent system. In such a system, every case could be subsumed under a given
legal proposition, all of which could in turn be derived, through successive
steps of logical implication, from a few, or perhaps even one, supreme prin-
ciple. It was regarded as the supreme task of "legal science" to discover and
formulate this system, and to develop the method by which it could be used
for the decision of every conceivable problem. Clearly, such a system could
never be found, and the practice of the courts, attorneys, and legislators could
not take too seriously that predominance which was claimed for it by some,
although never by all, of the scholars. Nevertheless, the widespread belief that
the science of law had as its task the development of the system and the deriva-
tion from it of rules of law directly applicable to every conceivable problem was
an important element in the development of that peculiar method of legal
thought which has come to be known as conceptual jurisprudence and which,
in its impressive consistency, spread to, and achieved a not inconsiderable
influence in, the countries of the common law. Not only in America, but also
in the countries of its origin, conceptual jurisprudence has come under attack.
In Germany, it has, indeed, ceased to be dominant. What seems to take its
place, both here and in Europe, is that kind of legal thinking which is known
as the functional approach, sociological jurisprudence, or jurisprudence of
interests.
In the little book here under review, Doctor Viehweg, editor of the Archiv
far Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, contrasts the method of "axiomatic," i.e.
systematizing jurisprudence, with another which he calls the "topical," and
which he finds to have been the method both of the Roman jurisconsults of
antiquity and of the Bartolists who sought to adapt the rediscovered Roman
texts to the practical needs of the later Middle Ages. The name of the method is
derived from Aristotle's Topics, in which it is analyzed as a tool of dialectical
discussion. Its entrance into the law is found in the close connection which is
said to have existed in ancient Rome between the jurists and the orators. In
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its application to law, especially in later European practice, the topical method
consisted in the formulation of certain maxims of broad significance, the totality
of which had in no way to form a coherent logical system, but which rather
contradicted each other often enough.
Which one of these manifold applicable maxims should be regarded as point-
ing out the solution of a concrete problem would be determined by the jurist
not in the process of the syllogism but by that sure touch which develops from
the jurist's being steeped in a fixed tradition and a definite style. The author's
illustrations are taken from continental law. Fitting examples might also be
found, however, in Anglo-American law, to which the "topical method" had
spread especially through the habit of 18th century judges and chancellors to
quote a good many of those regulae iuris which are listed in the 50th Book of
the Digest, and which, as maxims of equity, have helped many a chancellor to
find, or at least to justify, his decisions.
Doctor Viehweg's historical survey is of considerable interest for the scholar
of comparative law, especially when it is read in connection with Max Weber's
sociological comparison of methods of legal thought.' Of great value to the
method of comparative law is also the author's emphasis upon the necessity
in legal thought to start from the problem rather than. from the rule of law.
Only by comparing solutions of a common problem, and of the mental ways
in which the solution is found, is it possible to develop a "functional" method
of comparative law. We must be sceptical, however, as to the usefulness of the
topical method in contemporary legal thought. Systematic conceptualism
pretended to decide practical cases by the alleged application of purely deduc-
tive logic. In fact, this apparently deductive cognition frequently served to
hide volitional decisions of the legislator, the judge, or both. By thus hiding
the volitional policy decisions, the method tended to render them both in-
consistent and uncontrollable. The same effect is achieved by the topical
method, except that its non-systematic character is openly confessed. What
jurisprudence has been working for in our days is a method which makes ap-
parent to the lawmaker in the legislature and on the bench, as well as to the
citizen, the policy considerations on which the decision is, or ought to be,
based. No method hiding the policies of decision will be acceptable in the
age of democracy, psychoanalysis, and political science.
MAX RHEINSTEIN*
1 Law in Economy and Society (1954), esp. chapters 7-11.
* Board of editors.
JACKSON, R. M. The Machinery of Justice in England. 2nd ed. Cambridge: at
the University Press, 1953. Pp. ix, 372.
This is the second edition, partly rewritten and in various respects improved,
of the outstanding work on the administration of justice in England. Since the
first edition appeared in 1939, as the preface discloses, observation at close
